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Abstract
The behavioral relevance of non-binding defaults is well established. While most re-
search has focused on decision makers’ responses to a given default, we argue that
this individual decision making perspective is incomplete. Instead, a comprehensive
understanding of default effects requires to take account of the strategic interaction
between default setters and decision makers. We analyze theoretically and empirically
which defaults emerge in such interactions, and under which conditions defaults are
behaviorally most relevant. Our analysis demonstrates that the alignment of interests
between default setters and decision makers, as well as their relative level of information
are key drivers of default effects. In particular, default effects are more pronounced if
the interests of the default setter and decision makers are more closely aligned. More-
over, decision makers are more likely to follow default options the less they are privately
informed about the relevant decision environment.
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1 Introduction
A substantial body of empirical research has shown that non-binding default options can
strongly affect consumption and saving decisions. Default effects have been documented, for
instance, in decisions on retirement saving (Madrian and Shea 2001, Beshears et al. 2008,
Chetty et al. 2014), participation in workplace training (Borghans and Golsteyn 2014), con-
sumers’ choices of insurance coverage, product specifications, and utility contracts (Johnson
et al. 1993, Levav et al. 2010, Ebeling 2013), or consent to postmortem organ donations
(Johnson and Goldstein 2003). To explain why default effects arise in these contexts, the
literature has mainly focused on the preferences and characteristics of the decision maker,
relating individuals’ tendency to stick to defaults to factors such as status-quo biases, quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, or limited attention (e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, Carroll
et al. 2009, Caplin and Martin 2013).
In this paper, we argue that this individual decision making perspective is not suffi-
cient to fully understand the behavioral consequences of defaults. Instead, default effects
commonly arise in situations where default setters—firms, organizations, or governmental
agencies—deliberately specify the default option. Defaults are thus the outcome of an inher-
ently strategic interaction between the default setter and a population of decision makers.
As a consequence, the characteristics of both the default setter and the decision makers
might influence how defaults are being set, and to what extent they affect people’s choices.
By embracing their strategic nature, it also becomes apparent that defaults can constitute
a mode of communication between default setters and decision makers. To formalize our
arguments, we therefore apply a well-established theoretical framework of strategic commu-
nication to the question of how default effects arise. Specifically, we adopt a simplified version
of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which we incorporate two-sided asymmetric information, to
capture the notion that default setters as well as decision makers may differ in their knowledge
of what is the optimal choice for the decision maker.
Analyzing default effects from the perspective of strategic communication directly reveals
that the alignment of interests between default setters and decision makers, as well as their
relative knowledge of the decision environment can have important consequences for default
specifications and the strength of default effects in equilibrium. We demonstrate that both
factors indeed play a key role for the emergence of default effects. Specifically, we show that in
any Pareto-efficient equilibrium, defaults are set in a way that is more informative for decision
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makers if the interests between default setters and decision makers are more closely aligned.
At the same time, the reaction of rational agents to a default option depends on its informative
value, and is therefore itself related to the default setter’s level of benevolence. Moreover, our
theoretical analysis indicates that default effects should differ systematically across subgroups
of the population: when defaults are at odds with individuals’ own information, decision
markers who are less knowledgeable about the choice environment are more likely to stick
to defaults. In contrast, defaults do not affect choices of individuals who are particularly
well-informed about the decision.
The idea that defaults can be behaviorally relevant since they convey information and are
perceived as an implicit recommendation by the default setter has been informally discussed
in the literature on default effects (e.g., Madrian and Shea 2001, Johnson and Goldstein 2003,
McKenzie et al. 2006). We demonstrate that a well-established theoretical approach can be
used to capture this intuition in a unifying formal framework. Doing so also helps to organize
the existing empirical findings on default effects. For instance, McKenzie et al. (2006) as well
as Tannenbaum (2011) provide survey evidence supporting the notion that consumers stick
to defaults to follow the default setter’s recommendation. On the other hand, Brown and
Krishna (2004) have argued that “marketplace metacognition” makes consumers skeptical
about defaults set by profit maximizing firms; as a consequence, they should more heavily
rely on active choices. Our framework addresses both points of view, showing that the
informational content of default options and the extent to which consumers account for this
information both depend on the degree to which the interests of default setters and decision
makers are aligned.
Our results on differential reactions to defaults, depending on decision makers’ own knowl-
edge of the choice environment, are also consonant with a number of stylized facts from the
empirical literature. For instance, Bronchetti et al. (2013) find that saving defaults have es-
sentially no effect on behavior for individuals with strong prior consumption plans. Similarly,
in an experiment with environmental economists, Löfgren et al. (2012) observe no impact
of defaults in a carbon-offsetting program and attribute this finding to their participants’
high level of experience. The observation that less informed agents are more prone to follow
defaults is also made by Brown et al. (2011), who find that employees’ propensity to stick to
the default savings plan is negatively associated with their overall financial literacy. Further-
more, in a survey among the plan participants, 50% of those who remained in the default plan
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mentioned decision complexity or other information-related issues as a main reason to do so.
Finally, Levav et al. (2010) observe that default effects in product customization decisions
are more pronounced for consumers with a lower self-rated knowledge of the manufacturer’s
products. On a more general level, our results might also help to understand why defaults
sometimes have no aggregate effect on behavior, or why their effects are confined to relatively
small sup-groups of the population (e.g., Beshears et al. 2010, Altmann et al. 2014).
While a considerable body of evidence is thus consistent with the notion that incentives
and information matter for default effects, direct causal evidence on the role of this channel
has—to the best of our knowledge—remained scarce. In the second part of this paper, we
take a step towards closing this gap with the help of a laboratory experiment in which we
exogenously vary the alignment of interests as well as the level of information for default
setters and decision makers. In the experiment, we study a simple binary-choice paradigm
in which decision makers (“agents”) have to decide whether a set of nine cards, which can
be either red or black, contains more red cards or more black cards. Before making choices,
the default setter and the agents receive independent and informative signals on the agents’
payoffs from the two available choice options. The default setter selects one of the options as
the default and the agents, in turn, can accept the default option or make an active decision.
To identify the causal effects of default setters’ strategic incentives, we exogenously vary
whether preferences of the default setters are (i) fully aligned, (ii) partially aligned, or (iii)
misaligned with those of the agents (FUL, PAR, and MIS treatment, respectively). Within
each treatment, we additionally vary the relative level of information of default setters and
agents. In particular, there are always some agents who are better informed than the default
setter, and some agents whose information quality is below that of default setters.
Our empirical results underline the importance of strategic incentives and private infor-
mation for default setters’ and decision makers’ behavior. First, defaults truthfully reveal
default setters’ information in 98% of cases in FUL, but only in 75% of cases in PAR and
in 56% in MIS. Default setters with more closely aligned interests thus select informative
defaults, while defaults specified by default setters with misaligned preferences barely con-
vey any information. Second, agents are substantially more likely to accept defaults that
are chosen by more benevolent default setters, with 90%, 74%, and 58% of agents accepting
defaults in FUL, PAR, and MIS, respectively. Third, agents’ reaction to defaults strongly
depends on the quality of their personal information. In FUL and PAR, agents with low and
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intermediate levels of information strongly rely on the default options. At the same time,
decisions of agents with superior information are barely affected by defaults in either of the
treatments: in particular, well-informed agents almost always opt out when the default is
in conflict to their own information. Finally, our results suggest that defaults set by fully
or partially benevolent default setters can in fact enhance the aggregate quality of agents’
decisions, lending support to a common theme in the literature on “libertarian paternalism”
(Thaler and Sunstein 2003, Sunstein 2012). In particular, agents with lower levels of infor-
mation benefit substantially from accepting default options in the FUL and PAR treatment.
At the same time, default options do not distort choices of well-informed agents. However,
we also find that the effects on agents’ welfare are more mixed under misaligned incentives.
In particular, agents with intermediate levels of information tend to follow defaults somewhat
too frequently, with detrimental consequences for their payoffs.
Our theoretical framework as well as our empirical setup abstract from a number of factors
that have been discussed as potential sources of default effects. These include status-quo
effects and loss aversion (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, Kahneman et al. 1991), pecuniary
and non-pecuniary costs of opting out of defaults (Schwartz and Scott 2003, Thaler and
Sunstein 2003), quasi-hyperbolic discounting and procrastination of active decisions (Madrian
and Shea 2001, Carroll et al. 2009), or limited attention of decision makers (Caplin and Martin
2013). While abstracting from these individual-level motives helps us to isolate the strategic
aspects of default effects, this does not mean that we consider them of secondary importance.
Instead, the strategic aspects of defaults should influence the overall strength of default effects
independently of the other psychological factors that are at play. A loss-averse consumer,
for example, should also take his experience and knowledge of the decision environment into
account when deciding on whether or not to stick to a default. Similarly, consumers should
consider the intentions of default setters in a given choice setting even if they generally tend
to postpone active decisions. An important feature of our theoretical framework is that it is
flexible enough to be subsequently enriched by these factors.
Because defaults and strategic communication are intimately linked in our setup, our find-
ings also contribute to the existing body of empirical research on communication games. A
number of papers in this literature has investigated how communication depends on the align-
ment of interests (see Dickhaut et al. 1995, Gneezy 2005, Cai and Wang 2006, Sanchez-Pages
and Vorsatz 2007; see also Crawford 1998 for an overview of the early empirical literature).
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Focusing on the case of a fully informed sender who interacts with a single uninformed re-
ceiver, these studies have documented two main sets of results. First, it is typically found that
closer alignment of interests leads to more information transmission. Second, senders tend to
reveal somewhat more information than theoretically predicted, which can be explained by
individual-level differences in strategic reasoning (e.g., level-k models as in Crawford 2003,
Wang et al. 2010, or Crawford et al. 2013), genuine preferences for honest behavior (Gneezy
2005, Vanberg 2008), or a combination of the two. Our experiment shows that both of these
key results extend to the case of a partially informed sender—the default setter—who inter-
acts with a population of agents that differ in the quality of their information.1 Our data
further suggest that excess information revelation in our setting is primarily driven by a sub-
group of default setters with relatively strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (as measured
by a subscale of the HEXACO personality inventory; see Ashton and Lee 2009). At the same
time, however, our findings also point at the relevance of boundedly rational behavior. In
particular, subjects with low degrees of cognitive reflection (Frederick 2005) are significantly
more likely to follow defaults from default setters with misaligned interests if these are at
odds with their own information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formalize the
idea that defaults can be a means of strategic communication between default setters and
decision makers. We also derive testable implications for the experiment which we present
in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A communication perspective on default effects
In this section, we want to formalize the intuition that the nature of default effects depends on
the strategic incentives of default setters and decision makers, as well as the parties’ relative
level of information about the decision environment. Starting out from the idea that defaults
can constitute a mode of communication between default setters and decision makers, our
discussion in this section will be guided by the classic framework of strategic communication
by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Their work, as well as much of the following literature on
strategic communication, however, considers a fully informed sender who interacts with a sin-
1Complementary evidence on strategic communication with multiple receivers is provided by Battaglini
and Makarov (2014) and Drugov et al. (2013). Their focus, however, is on a fully informed sender who
interacts with two uninformed receivers that differ in their preferences. In contrast, we focus on heterogeneity
in agents’ information, while holding the alignment of preferences constant within a given treatment.
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gle, non-informed receiver. In contrast, defaults are typically observed in situations in which
a single default setter interacts with a population of decision makers. Moreover, a common
feature of choice environments with defaults is that decision makers have at least partial
information about the decision at hand; the decision-relevant information might, however,
be heterogeneously distributed in the population. Finally, it is often argued that the default
setter herself might not be fully informed about the decision environment (e.g., Sunstein
2012, Sunstein 2013). To capture these feature, we therefore present a simplified version of
Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which we incorporate two-sided asymmetric information, as
well as a population of decision makers that is characterized by heterogeneous information
quality.2 All proofs can be found in Section A.1 in the appendix.
2.1 Model setup
In our model, one default-setter (i.e., the “sender” in the communication game) interacts with
a population of rational decision makers (the “agents” or “receivers”). The decision makers
choose an action z in order to maximize their utility UA(z, θ), which is strictly concave in z
for all θ. Agents’ preferences over the choice alternatives depend on the state of the world,
θ, which takes value θh or θl with equal probability. More precisely, we assume that the
partial derivative of UA(z, θl) with respect to z is smaller than the corresponding derivative
of UA(z, θh) for all z. Higher zs are thus optimal for agents that put more probability weight
on θh. Decision makers choose between a finite number of options z ∈ {z1, . . . , zm} with
zi < zi+1, where the choice set is rich enough such that the maximizer of UA(z, θl) differs
from the one of UA(z, θh).
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2A number of other papers have recently studied different aspects of strategic communication in settings
with two-sided asymmetric information (Chen 2009, Moreno de Barreda 2013, Lai 2014). Chen (2009) shows
that equilibrium communication in such settings can be non-monotone, i.e., senders may communicate if
the state is “extreme” or “intermediate” instead of “high” vs. “low”. Moreover, she finds that the receiver
cannot credibly reveal her signal when communicating to the sender first. Moreno de Barreda (2013) and
Lai (2014) demonstrate that enhanced private information of the receiver can lead to a decrease in the level
of communication and potentially even reduce the decision maker’s welfare, relative to a benchmark with a
fully informed sender and a single uninformed receiver. In contrast, our focus is on the interaction between
a partially informed sender (the default setter) and a heterogeneous population of receivers (the decision
makers). Moreover, we want to allow for situations in which a fraction of the population can be strictly
better informed about the decision than the default-setting institution.
3Letting the agents choose from a continuous action space does not alter our theoretical results. However,
default options are frequently observed in choice environments that entail only a finite number of alternatives.
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While the true state of the world is ex ante unobservable, the default setter and the
decision makers receive incomplete private information about it. The quality of agents’
information may differ within the population. In particular, decision makers are distributed
according to a “knowledge function” f(x), with full support over [1
2
, 1], where x is the signal
strength of agent x. Agents’ signals are denoted by σ ∈ {σl, σh} and have conditional
distributions p(σl|θl) = p(σh|θh) = x. The default setter also has private information about
the optimal decision for the agents. Her signal is drawn independently from the ones of the
agents and is denoted by ρ ∈ {ρl, ρh} with signal quality q = p(ρl|θl) = p(ρh|θh) ∈ (12 , 1).
Consequently, the default setter is always better informed about the state of the world than
some of the decision makers, and worse than others.
While the default setter cannot directly influence the agents’ decisions, she can determine
a default option d ∈ {d1, . . . , dn} to which agents’ are exposed when making their choices.
Defaults in our setup are thus a mode of communication through which the default setter
may transmit her private knowledge about what is optimal for the agents.4 The default
setter’s utility resulting from choice z of any agent in the population is a weighted sum of
the agent’s utility, UA(θ, z), and a term b(z) that captures a potential conflict of interests.
UP (θ, z) = µUA(θ, z) + b(z)
For the overall objective of the default setter, we assume for simplicity that she puts equal
weight on the utility (received from the decisions) of different agents.5 The parameter µ
is common knowledge and describes the alignment of interests between the default setter
and the decision makers. For small µ, the default setter cares only little about the agents’
well-being and focuses more strongly on her private interests. For large µ, the preferences of
the default setter and the agents are more closely aligned. µ thus captures the notion that
defaults are observed in a variety of contexts in which the strategic interests of the default-
setting institutions may differ. For example, the alignment of interests may be stronger
For instance, consumers can choose between the default energy contract or a “green” alternative, they can
stick to the default car configuration or choose from a set of optional features, etc. (Ebeling 2013, Levav
et al. 2010).
4An interesting follow-up question, which is beyond the scope of this paper, would be to analyze the
conditions under which a sender decides to communicate through a default rather than through other possible
modes of communication (e.g., direct recommendations, advertisement, frames, or other cheap-talk messages).
5It is straightforward to extend the model to incorporate a weighting function with heterogeneous weights
for different subgroups of the population.
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between a governmental agency and consumers than it is the case for a profit maximizing
firm that specifies default product configurations for her customers. To put structure on
the default setter’s preferences, we assume an upward bias in the sense that b(z) is strictly
increasing in z. Hence, the utility-maximizing choice of z for the default setter is weakly
higher than the one for the agents.
The game is divided into four stages. In stage 1 nature draws the state of the world, θ, and
all private signals. Moreover, all agents and the default setter observe their corresponding
signal. In stage 2, the default setter determines the default option d. In stage 3, the default
is revealed to the agents, and they decide individually on which choice z to implement.
Dependent on the choice and the true state of the world, payoffs for agents and the default
setter are realized in stage 4. In this setup, a strategy of the default setter sP (ρ) specifies the
probability of every default to be chosen for all possible signals ρ. A pure strategy sxA(σ, d)
of decision maker x determines for any combination of a private signal σ and a default d the
choice of z.6 As a solution concept we apply perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
In the following analysis we concentrate on equilibria in which all defaults are played with pos-
itive probability. This is without loss of generality, since every equilibrium can be replicated
by an output equivalent equilibrium without out-of-equilibrium defaults. More precisely, for
every PBE there exists another PBE that involves playing all feasible defaults such that the
ex ante probabilities of any utility outcome for the agents and the default setter are identical.7
Before agents decide on z, the default setter can try to induce a more favorable outcome
to herself by appropriately specifying the default option. Whenever the default setter receives
a high signal, her preferences are aligned with those of the agents. In this case, the message
that most certainly signals the high state of the world maximizes both her selfish interests
b(z) and the utility of the decision makers. As a consequence, all defaults that are set
with positive probability after a high signal must have the same informational content and
are therefore qualitatively identical. The remaining defaults, in contrast, reveal that the
default setter received a low signal. According to this distinction we can split the set of
6In general, an agent may be indifferent between different actions z and mix over the actions in equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the set of agents that are indifferent between at least two actions has mass zero. Hence,
extending the analysis to mixed strategies does not provide any additional insights.
7The construction of the output equivalent perfect Bayesian equilibrium can be found in the appendix.
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defaults {d0, . . . , dn} into two parts. Denote by {d0, . . . dk−1} = Dl the set of defaults that
are exclusively played after a low signal and by {dk . . . , dn} = Dh the set of defaults that are
played with positive probability after a high signal. For simplicity, we call each default in
Dh a “high default” (dh) and those in Dl “low defaults” (dl).
Lemma 1. In equilibrium the default setter uses at most two qualitatively different defaults.
Using the lemma we are able to characterize the amount of information that is transmitted
through the default by a single parameter c = p(d0|ρl) + · · · + p(dk−1|ρl). The higher the
transmission rate c, the higher is the likelihood that the default setter truthfully reveals
having received a low signal by setting a low default, thereby leading to more information
transmission in equilibrium. In the following, we say that an equilibrium is informative if the
default has at least some informational content, i.e., if c > 0.
Alignment of interests
Intuitively, an agent’s decision to follow a default may depend on the default setter’s level
of benevolence. A default setter with opposing interests may try to use her private infor-
mation to extract a higher rent for herself. Anticipating this, decision makers should rely
less strongly on the defaults specified by such a default setter. In contrast, a default setter
whose interests are more closely aligned with those of the agents may specify a default that is
more informative for the agents; her defaults should thus be more likely to be followed. The
following result corroborates this intuition. Note that, in general, there may emerge multiple
equilibria exhibiting different levels of information transmission. In particular, there always
exist babbling equilibria in which the default does not convey any information. To refine the
set of equilibria, we employ the Pareto-efficiency criterion and focus on the question how an
informative Pareto-efficient equilibrium depends on the model’s main parameters.
Proposition 1. For informative Pareto-efficient equilibria, larger µ imply a higher infor-
mation transmission rate c(µ). Agents internalize this effect and exhibit more pronounced
reactions to defaults the higher is µ, i.e., sxA(σi, dh) is increasing and s
x
A(σi, dl) is decreasing
in µ.
The proposition mirrors the main insight of Crawford and Sobel (1982) for our setting with
a binary state space and a heterogeneously informed population of agents. The underlying
intuition is straightforward. With increasing µ the default setter’s preferences become more
closely aligned to those of the agents. As a consequence, her utility of a truthful report
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increases relative to the utility of concealing her private information. This leads to a higher
information transmission rate c. The higher informational content of the default yields,
ceteris paribus, a stronger incentive for decision makers to adapt their choice towards the
default. In particular, in case the default is in conflict with an agent’s private signal, the
agent weighs the default more heavily for higher µ. Hence, default effects are stronger in
a given population if the interests between the population and the default setter are more
closely aligned.
Finally, consider the two extreme cases of a fully benevolent (µ → ∞) and a fully selfish
(µ = 0) default setter, for later reference. In the former case, preferences are completely
aligned and the default setter incorporates all her private information in the default in any
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. In the latter case, in contrast, the default setter conceals her
information completely and the default never conveys any information.
The quality of information
Differences in agents’ knowledge about the decision environment are a potentially important
reason why the strength of defaults effects may differ across subgroups of the population. In
our model, such differences in agents’ information are captured by the agents’ signal strength,
x. Intuitively, agents who are less familiar with the choice environment may rely more heavily
on the information conveyed through the default option. In contrast, decision makers with
particularly accurate private information may rely less on defaults. The following proposition
shows that this intuition is indeed correct.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the strategies of any two agents with x1 < x2 exhibit the
following properties:
sx1A (σl, di) ≥ s
x2
A (σl, di) s
x1
A (σh, di) ≤ s
x2
A (σh, di) for i ∈ {l, h}
Agents are less prone to adapt their decision towards a given default if the quality of their
personal information increases. The relationship between agents’ knowledge and the degree
of default adherence is most clearly seen if the default and the agent’s private signal are in
conflict. For instance, the strategy sxA(σl, dh), which describes agents’ behavior after a high
default and a low personal signal, is decreasing in the information quality x. Consequently,
agents with more informative signals shift “further” away from the high default and rely
more strongly on their own information.
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To wrap up, our discussion in this section has shown that the classic framework of strategic
communication can successfully be adopted to capture the idea that defaults may constitute
a mode of communication between default setters and decision makers. While this intuition
has informally been discussed in the literature on default effects (e.g., Madrian and Shea
2001, Johnson and Goldstein 2003, McKenzie et al. 2006), our analysis illustrates that the
strategic incentives of default setters and decision makers and the parties’ relative level of
information can influence the specification of default options, the overall strength of default
effects, and the impact of defaults on different subgroups of the population. The comparative
static predictions of our theoretical analysis are both intuitively plausible and consistent with
a number of stylized facts from the empirical literature on defaults (see, e.g., McKenzie et al.
2006, Levav et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2011, Bronchetti et al. 2013). In the following sections,
we will provide direct causal evidence on the role of incentives and information for default
effects, based on a controlled laboratory experiment.
3 Design of the experiment
3.1 The game
In the experiment, we examine the key comparative statics of our theoretical framework
regarding the impact of strategic incentives and private information on default effects. An
important advantage of the laboratory environment is that we can directly vary both dimen-
sions of interest, while holding all other aspects of the choice environment and the population
of decision makers constant. Specifically, we consider two distinct treatment dimensions.
First, we exogenously vary the alignment of interests between default setters and decision
makers. We consider three different situations in which preferences of the default setter and
the agents are (i) fully aligned, (ii) partially aligned, or (iii) misaligned (in what follows,
we refer to the three conditions as the “FUL”, “PAR”, and “MIS” treatment, respectively).
Second, for a given level of benevolence, our empirical approach ensures controlled variation
in the relative level of information between the default setter and the agents.
As a workhorse for implementing these treatment conditions, we use a simple paradigm in
which one default setter interacts with one decision maker. In each period, the agent has to
decide whether a set of nine cards, which can either be red or black, contains more red cards
or more black cards. Each card in each period is drawn independently with probabilities
p(Red) = p(Black) = 0.5, i.e., the ex-ante likelihood that a given set of cards contains more
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cards of a given color is 0.5. Before making choices, the default setter and the agent receive
independent signals about the composition of the current set of cards.
The default setter receives the signal via a message on her screen. The message either
indicates that the current set of cards contains “more black cards” or “more red cards”. The
signal is private information of the default setter. Her signal strength, however, is common
knowledge and held constant at q = 0.8. Whether a default setter receives a correct or wrong
signal in a given period is determined randomly and independently between default setters,
periods, and sessions.
Agents receive information about the number of red and black cards in the current set,
by a subset of cards that is privately revealed to them. In each period, a coin flip determines
whether the first two or the first five cards in the set are uncovered for a given agent.8 The
signal-generating mechanism for agents ensures that we obtain controlled variation of the
information quality for different types of agents. Since each of the revealed cards for the
agent is black or red with probability 0.5, we obtain five different levels of signal strengths.
The resulting distribution of agents’ signal qualities is reported in Table 1. Since the default
setter’s signal strength is always 0.8, the agent is informed worse than the default setter
in about 56% of cases (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1); in about 25% of cases he has about
the same signal strength (Column 3 in Table 1), and in 19% of cases (Columns 4 and 5),
the agent is better informed than the default setter. We can therefore test whether agents
with different levels of information about the decision systematically differ in their behavior,
holding default setters’ information quality and benevolence constant (Proposition 2).
Agent Type A50 A69 A77 A94 A100
Signal Quality 0.5 0.69 0.77 0.94 1.00
Occurrence Probability 0.25 0.313 0.25 0.156 0.031
Example 1 black 3 black 2 black 4 black 5 black
1 red 2 red 0 red 1 red 0 red
Table 1: Distribution of agents’ signals.
Participants in the experiment do not see Table 1, but the signal-generating mechanism
for default setters and agents is common knowledge. In particular, the default setter knows
8Figure A.1 in the appendix depicts an example of an agent’s information screen.
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the procedure how the agent is informed, and consequently the distribution of signal qualities.
However, she is not informed about the number or colors of the cards that are revealed to
the agents in a specific period. Hence, in line with our theoretical framework, the default
setter essentially plays against a population of agents as depicted in Table 1, although default
setters and agents are matched one-to-one in a given period.
After having received her signal, the default setter selects the default option for the current
period. She can either specify “more red cards” or “more black cards” as the default. Default
setters in the experiment can thus “communicate” with the agents through the default option,
and reveal or conceal their private information by specifying the default accordingly. In a
next step, the agent is informed about the default option. He can then accept the default
or opt out and take an active decision. To confirm or change the default option in the
experiment, the agent has to press the respective button displayed on his screen. In case
the agent accepts the default option, the selected default is implemented as final decision for
both the default setter and the agent. If the agent presses “opt out”, a new screen pops up
on which the agent can (actively) choose between “more red cards” and “more black cards”
as her ultimate decision for this period.9 After the agent has taken his decision, he is asked
to state his perceived certainty that his choice was correct on an 8-points Likert scale. In
a final stage of the game, default setter and agent are provided with a feedback screen, on
which the entire set of cards for the current period is revealed. Furthermore, players are
informed about the agent’s final decision and the resulting payoffs for both players.
3.2 Treatments and payoffs
Agents earn points if their decision in a given period is correct (i.e., the chosen color matches
the color that occurs more frequently in their current set of cards). In each of the three
treatments, payoffs for agents were calculated as follows:
πA =
 50 points if decision correct0 if decision wrong
Payoff functions for default setters differed across treatment conditions. In treatment
FUL, default setters’ payoffs are perfectly aligned with those of the agents. Thus, a default
9We neither impose a time limit for default setters nor for agents making their final decision. This
procedure ensures that the cost of opting out of the default is minimal, while at the same time avoiding
mistakes due to time pressure or accidental clicks.
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setter receives 50 points if the agent’s decision in a given period is correct, and 0 otherwise:
πFULP =
 50 points if A’s decision correct0 if A’s decision wrong
In contrast, default setters in the treatment with misaligned preferences (MIS), receive 50
points if and only if the agent’s decision in a given period is “more red cards”. They receive
0 points if the agent’s decision is “more black cards”:
πMISP =
 50 points if A’s decision “red”0 if A’s decision “black”
This payoff function induces a default setter who wants to direct the agent towards one
particular alternative, without taking the welfare consequences for the agent into account,
i.e., a default setter with fully selfish interests. Another theoretically equivalent way to
implement misaligned preferences is to assume that default setters receive points if and only
if agents do not receive any points.10 We opted for the first version to keep the setting as
understandable for the subjects as possible. To induce partial benevolence, each matching
group in our third treatment, PAR, consisted of 50% benevolent and 50% selfish default
setters with payoff functions πFULP and π
MIS
P , respectively. Agents are not informed about
which type of default setter they are matched with in a given period. From agents’ (ex
ante) perspective, this treatment is thus equivalent to interacting with a partially benevolent
default setter.
3.3 Parameters and procedures
We conducted a total 12 sessions of the experiment, four each for the FUL, PAR, and MIS
treatment. In each of the sessions, we had 12 default setters and 12 agents interacting
over 50 periods. Subjects within a session were divided into two matching groups with 12
participants each. Default setters and agents within a given matching group were randomly
rematched between periods, yielding 8 independent observations per treatment for the non-
parametric tests reported below. Points earned throughout the experiment were converted
at an exchange rate of 100 points = 1 Euro. Overall, sessions lasted about 120 minutes,
and subjects earned on average 24.32 euros (about 32 USD at the time of the experiment),
including a showup fee of 4 euros.
10In both cases, the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the babbling equilibrium in which defaults
convey no information.
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All sessions were carried out in the BonnEconLab, the laboratory for economic exper-
iments at the University of Bonn. The experiment was computerized using the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and subjects were recruited with the online recruitment system
by Greiner (2003). A total of 288 subjects (96 in each treatment) took part in the experiment.
Subjects were mainly undergraduate university students from all majors, and participated in
only one of the treatment conditions. To ensure public knowledge of the rules and structure
of the experiment, a summary of the instructions for the respective treatment was read out
aloud at the beginning of each session. Participants then received detailed written informa-
tion about the experiment.11 The experiment started only after all participants had answered
several control questions correctly.
3.4 Hypotheses
Applying our model to the setup and parameters of the experiment yields the following
predictions for differences in behavior between treatments and agent types.
Hypothesis 1. Default setters’ propensity to truthfully reveal their signal through defaults
is highest in FUL, intermediate in PAR, and lowest in MIS.
In particular, default setters in FUL should always truthfully reveal their signal. In
contrast, defaults specified by fully selfish default setters (MIS) should convey no information.
Since 50% of default setters in PAR are benevolent and 50 % are selfish, the truthfulness of
defaults in this treatment should lie in between MIS and FUL.
Hypothesis 2. Agents’ aggregate propensity to accept defaults should be highest in FUL,
intermediate in PAR, and lowest in MIS.
This aggregate hypothesis is derived from a more specific sub-hypothesis. Proposition 1
implies that the strength of default effects is weakly increasing in the benevolence of the
default setter. Applying Proposition 1 to the parameters of the experiment, it predicts that
agents’ propensity to accept a default that is in conflict with their private information should
be strictly higher in FUL than in PAR, and strictly higher in PAR than in MIS for “low-
information types” (types A50, A69, and A77 in Table 1).12 In contrast, the model predicts
11A translation of the instructions for the PAR treatment can be found in Section A.3 in the appendix.
12Since some of the predictions are equal for individual types of agents who have lower signal quality than
the default setter, we jointly denote types A50, A69, and A77 from Table 1 as “low-information types” for
ease of exposition. Types A94 and A100 are denoted as “high-information types”, accordingly.
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no treatment difference in default adherence after conflicting signals for “high-information
types” (type A94 and A100 in Table 1). Similarly, the application of Proposition 2 to each
of the treatments yields the following hypothesis for behavioral differences in the within-
subjects dimension (behavior of low-information vs. high-information types within a given
treatment):
Hypothesis 3. In case of conflicting signals, low-information agents should be strictly more
likely to accept defaults than high-information agents in FUL and PAR. There should be no
difference in acceptance rates between low-information and high-information types in MIS.
Finally, the above predictions for differences in behavior yield the following hypothesis for
differences in the overall quality of agents’ decisions, as measured by the resulting monetary
payoffs.
Hypothesis 4. For low-information types, the presence of default options increase the quality
of decisions in FUL and PAR and has no influence in MIS. For high-information types, the
quality of decisions is not affected by the presence of default options.
4 Results
In this section, we present the results of the experiment. We first summarize the behavior of
default setters and analyze whether the informational content of defaults differs across treat-
ments (Hypothesis 1). We then focus on the agents, and study how agents react to defaults
in FUL, PAR, and MIS (Hypothesis 2). In a next step, we analyze differences in agents’ be-
havior, depending on their relative level of information (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we compare
the quality of decisions for the different types of agents across treatments (Hypothesis 4).
4.1 How do default setters specify defaults?
Figure 1 summarizes default setters’ behavior in the different treatments. The figure depicts
the average frequency of defaults that correspond to the default setters’ private signal about
the state of the world. In line with Hypothesis 1, we observe strong treatment differences in
the likelihood that defaults truthfully reveal default setters’ private signal. Fully benevolent
default setters (FUL) almost always reveal their signal (in 98% of cases). In contrast, default
setters reveal their private signal only in 75% of cases in PAR13 values of defaults setters.
13For the PAR treatment, we display the average level of information revelation over both types of default
setters (i.e., those with misaligned and aligned preferences), since this is the crucial metric from the agents’
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Selfish default setters set the default according to their private signal in only 56% of cases.
Hence, defaults in the MIS treatment convey hardly any information about the default setters’

































Figure 1: Frequency of default setters setting default according to their signal. Average
values per period in FUL, PAR, and MIS treatment.
defaults is highly significant for all pairwise treatment comparisons (Fisher-exact tests, p <
.001 for FUL vs. PAR, FUL vs. MIS, and PAR vs. MIS).14 Figure A.2 in the appendix
shows that default setters’ behavior is relatively stable over time in all treatments. The
strong difference between treatments is already observed in the first periods, and we find no
significant time trend in either of the treatments.
Overall, default setters’ behavior in the experiment is not only qualitatively in line with
our theoretical model, but also matches the quantitative predictions relatively accurately. A
noteworthy exception is observed in the MIS treatment. The model predicts that defaults set
by fully selfish default setters convey no information in equilibrium. That is, the likelihood
of a default setters’ signal being red or black should be 50%, independently of the observed
default. Default setters’ behavior in the experiment comes close to this prediction. However,
the actual frequency of informative defaults in MIS is 56%. A similar pattern of over-
perspective.
14Unless otherwise noted, all non-parametric tests are based on matching-group averages. Reported p-
values are always two-sided.
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communication for the case of misaligned interests has also been observed in a number of
previous experiments on strategic communication (e.g., Gneezy 2005, Cai and Wang 2006,
Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz 2007). There are two broad sets of motives that could account
for this deviation from equilibrium predictions. First, the higher informativeness of defaults
could be explained by boundedly rational behavior of players (e.g., level-k reasoning as in
Crawford 2003 or Wang et al. 2010). Second, some default setters in MIS might not be
fully selfish in the sense that they deliberately provide agents with information about their
private signal. This could, for instance, be due to some intrinsic preferences for honesty
(Vanberg 2008, Erat and Gneezy 2012, Fischbacher and Heusi 2013), aversion towards payoff
inequalities (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), or other forms of social preferences. Put differently,
the true preferences of some default setters might not coincide with the monetary incentives
induced in the MIS treatment.
Our data allow us to shed some light on the relevance of both channels in our setting.
To do so, we focus on default setters in the MIS treatment and relate their default-setting
behavior to different individual-level characteristics of the players. As a measure for the
truthfulness of defaults, we calculate the relative frequency with which an individual default
setter specifies a black default after receiving a black signal.15 We then estimate a regression
model with the default setters’ individual truthfulness frequencies as dependent variable and
different individual-level characteristics obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire
as regressors. As an indicator for the “social preference” channel, we include the “Honesty-
Humility-Scale”, HHS—a subscale of the HEXACO personality questionnaire designed to
measure an individual’s inclination to avoid manipulation of others for personal gain (Ashton
and Lee 2009).16 As proxies for the “bounded rationality” channel, we include default setters’
scores in the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005), as well as their final math grade in
high school.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows that default setters who score higher on the Honesty-Humility-
Scale have a significantly higher likelihood to truthfully reveal a black signal in the MIS
treatment. This suggests that heterogeneity in default setters’ instrinsic preferences for hon-
esty can at least partially account for the overcommunication that we observe. Column 2
15We concentrate on the case of black signals since default setters almost unanimously select red defaults
after a red signal (in 98.6% of cases). That is, default setters mostly choose to shade their private information
by always selecting “red” as the default (the overall frequency of red defaults in MIS is 93.4%).
16The HHS ranges from -60 to +40. Higher scores indicate a higher inclination to avoid manipulations.
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Dependent variable: Frequency with which default setter






Math grade 2.926 2.621
(3.354) (3.751)
Const. 12.573*** 6.870 6.927
(1.273) (11.294) (13.021)
N 48 48 48
R2 .098 .050 .134
Table 2: Determinants of default setters’ behavior in MIS. OLS estimations; reported stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) account for potential clustering on the matching-group level. The
honesty-humility-scale, HHS, measures an individual’s inclination to avoid manipulation of
others for personal gain (Ashton and Lee 2009). It ranges from -60 to +40, which higher
scores indicating a higher inclination to avoid manipulations. The cognitive-reflection test,
CRT, is a three-item questionnaire that measures an individual’s inclination to suppress a
spontaneous, but wrong answer (Frederick 2005). “Math grade” measures participants’ final
high-school math grade. Grades range from 1-6 with 1 being the best grade.
shows that our proxies of cognitive ability also point in the expected direction. Specifically,
worse (i.e., higher) math grades as well as lower CRT scores are both associated with a higher
propensity to communicate truthfully under misaligned interests. Both effects, however, turn
out to be insignificant. When including both sets of measures (Column 3), the indicator for
honesty stays (weakly) significant, whereas the measures for cognitive reflection and math
abilities remain insignificant. Overall, our evidence thus suggests that the “too informative”
defaults observed in MIS might primarily be driven by preferences for honest behavior among
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Figure 2: Fraction of agents accepting the default. Average values in FUL, PAR, and MIS.
4.2 How do agents react to defaults?
In the next step, we turn to the analysis of agents’ reactions to defaults in the different
treatments. Figure 2 depicts the aggregate frequencies of default adherence for agents in
FUL, PAR, and MIS. Agents accept the default specified by default setters in 90% of cases
in FUL, 74% of cases in PAR, and 58% of cases in MIS. All pairwise treatment differences
in agents’ behavior are statistically significant (Fisher-exact tests, p < .001 for FUL vs.
PAR, FUL vs. MIS, and PAR vs. MIS). Figure A.3 in the appendix depicts the frequency
of default acceptance in the different treatments over time. Again, we observe a strong
difference between treatments already in the first periods and relatively stable behavior over
time. The only treatment exhibiting a significant decrease in default acceptance over time is
the MIS treatment.17 The overall differences in agents’ default acceptance rates are in line
with our theoretical predictions, lending support to Hypothesis 2.
Thus, agents account for differences in the default setters’ benevolence and the resulting
differences in the informativeness of defaults on the aggregate level. This also holds for each
type of agent. The top panel of Figure 3 depicts the average frequency of default acceptance
17A linear time trend is significant at the 5% level in a probit estimation where the dependent variable is
1 if an agent accepts the default, and 0 otherwise (p=.030, accounting for potential clustering in standard










































































A50 A69 A77 A94 A100
PARFUL
MIS
Figure 3: Fraction of agents accepting the default. Upper panel: average aggregate values
for different agent types in FUL, PAR, and MIS. Bottom panel: cases where default is in
conflict with agents’ private signal; average values for different agent types in FUL, PAR,
and MIS.
for the five different types of agents in the different treatments.18 Substantiating our previous
results, we find that the likelihood of accepting defaults increases in the benevolence of the
default setter for each individual type of agent.
Next we analyze agents’ reactions to defaults that are at odds with their private signal.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the behavior of the different types of agents, if they face
a default that is in conflict with their private signal (e.g., the agent observes three black and
18Agents are ordered according to their signal quality. For instance, type “A69” in Figure 3 are agents
who received a signal with 69% precision in a given period (Column 2 in Table 1).
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two red cards, but a red default).19 The data depicted in the graph allow us to directly test
the sub-hypothesis implied by Proposition 1. In particular, we predicted that low-information
types are strictly more likely to accept defaults in FUL than in PAR after conflicting signals,
and strictly more likely in PAR than in MIS. In contrast, we expect no treatment effects
for agents who have superior information than the default setter. The figure indicates that
both predictions are borne out by our data. We find that the default adherence rate for low-
information types is strictly increasing in the benevolence of the default setter if the default
is in conflict with their private signal (Fisher-exact test for low-information types. FUL vs.
PAR: p < .001, FUL vs. MIS: p < .001, PAR vs MIS: p = .010). In contrast, the reactions
of high-information types do not differ significantly across treatments (Fisher-exact test for
high-information types. FUL vs. PAR: p = 1.000, FUL vs. MIS: p = .619, PAR vs MIS:
p = .619).
The bottom panel of Figure 3 also allows to test Hypothesis 3, which predicts that high-
information types are less likely to accept conflicting defaults than agents with lower-quality
information when facing a default setter who is at least partially benevolent. This within-
treatment effect is borne out by the data (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for high-information
types vs. low-information types, p = .012 for FUL and PAR). However, the difference remains
significant when analyzing the MIS treatment, while we hypothesized that there are no type-
specific differences in behavior as a response to selfish defaults (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = .012). The latter difference is driven by low-information types who follow conflicting
defaults in the MIS treatment in about 20% of cases.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows that the diverging reactions of agents to conflicting de-
faults also induce overall differences in type-specific default acceptance rates. Agents who
are better informed than the default setter (i.e., Type A94 and A100) are less likely to ac-
cept defaults than agents with inferior information quality if the default setter is (partially)
benevolent. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirms that high-information types behave signif-
icantly different than low-information types in both the FUL and PAR treatment (p = .012,
for both FUL and PAR). When being confronted with selfish default setters, the effect is less
pronounced and turns out to be insignificant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .161). This is
in line with the prediction of our theoretical model: Since defaults convey no information in
19Note that type A50 is excluded from the analysis. Since these types have no informative signal (1 red
card and 1 black card), there is no conflict between the private signal and the default.
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a babbling equilibrium, all types of agents should merely rely on their private signal.
Overall, the empirical results support Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 from our model.
However, we again find some deviations from the model’s predictions. In particular, agents
with low and intermediate levels of information seem to trust defaults in the MIS treatment
“too much”. This becomes most evident when looking at behavior of type A69 and A77 in
case of conflicting signals (bottom panel of Figure 3). Our model predicts that all types of
agents completely ignore defaults set by a fully selfish default setter. For conflicting signals,
we thus expect default acceptance rates close to zero for A69 and A77, whereas the acceptance
rates in the experiment are about 20% for both types of agents.20
However, we have already seen that some default setters in the MIS treatment do not
behave in a fully selfish way. That is, defaults in the MIS treatment are—on the aggregate
level—not fully uninformative from the agents’ perspective. This raises the question whether
the default acceptance rate by low-information agents that we observe is caused by “too much
trust” in selfish defaults (i.e., a mistake by low-information agents) or rather a best response
to the informational content of the defaults that agents face during the experiment. If agents’
choices are a best response to the behavior of default setters, the overall quality of agents’
decision should be as least as high as in an environment in which there are no defaults and
agents always follow their private signal. The next section explores in more detail whether
this is the case.
4.3 Do defaults improve decisions?
In the final step of our empirical analysis, we turn to the question whether defaults improve
the overall quality of agents’ decisions in our experiment. We also study how the impact
of defaults on decision quality depends on the agents’ level of information and the default
setters’ level of benevolence. Figure 4 depicts the percentage change in the agents’ decision
quality compared to a hypothetical situation in which agents are assumed to always follow
their private signals.21 This scenario mimics a choice environment in which there are no
default options and agents can base their decision only on their private signal. Positive
values of the difference between actual and hypothetical decision quality in Figure 4 thus
20A similar effect is observed in the PAR treatment where we observe acceptance rates of 40-50% instead
of 20-30% as predicted by our model.
21To construct a measure of decision quality in this situation, we use the sets of cards and the actually
realized private signals in the experiment for each agent.
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indicate that agents benefited from defaults, while negative values mean that they would
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Figure 4: Percentage change in agents’ decision quality compared to a hypothetical situation
in which agents always follow their own signal, for different agent types and treatments.
Figure 4 indicates that the decision quality of high-information types (A94, A100) is
hardly affected by the presence of defaults. This holds independently of the alignment of
preferences between default setters and decision makers, and it reiterates the observation
that these types react appropriately to their high signal quality: whenever the default option
is in conflict with their private information, these agents tend to rely on the latter. Thus,
there are little or no distortions in the decisions of well-informed agents.
For agents with lower information quality, the extent to which default options are welfare-
enhancing depends on the agent’s level of information and, more importantly, on the align-
ment of interests with the default setter. In the FUL treatment where default setter’s and
agents’ information are fully aligned, we observe generally positive effects of default options,
relative to the situation without default specifications. In particular, the agents with the low-
est quality of private information (A50 and A69) make use of the informativeness of defaults
which are set by the better informed default setter, and thereby attain higher payoffs.
For the PAR and MIS treatment, our findings on the effects of defaults for agents with
low information quality are somewhat mixed. First, we observe unambiguously positive
22Note that this analysis provides a lower bound on the potentially beneficial effects of defaults in our
setup, since it assumes that agents make no mistakes in the decision environment without defaults.
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effects on the decision quality of agents with no information (A50). For type A69 who has
intermediate information quality, defaults set by partially benevolent or selfish default setters
have almost no impact on the decision quality, with slightly positive overall consequences in
the PAR treatment, and slightly negative ones in the MIS treatment. Finally, the results
for type A77 suggest that agents with information quality similar to the one of the default
setter seem to misperceive the informational content of the default and rely to little on
their private information. As a consequence, defaults in the MIS and PAR treatment are
detrimental for agents’ decision quality in this case.23 Overall, this finding suggests that a
sound understanding of the strategic incentives and the relative quality of one’s own and the
default setters’ information are crucial for agents to reap the benefits of informative defaults,
without bearing the detrimental consequences of following ill-specified ones.24
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed two key channels through which non-binding default options
can affect behavior—the strategic incentives of default setting institutions, and the default
setter’s and decision makers’ relative level of information about the decision environment.
While both aspects have been informally discussed in the literature, we show that a well-
established theoretical approach from the literature on strategic communication can be used
to analyze these intuitions in a unifying formal framework. Adopting the notion that defaults
can be a mode of strategic communication yields two main testable predictions. First, default
options should have a stronger impact on behavior when the interests of the default setter
and decision makers are more closely aligned. Second, whenever decision makers face a con-
flict between a default option and their own information about the decision, those with less
information are more prone to accept the default. The empirical results from our laboratory
experiment lend support to both of these predictions. In particular, the informational content
23Performing an analysis similar to the one in Table 2 further reveals systematic individual-level differences
in agents’ tendency to accept “conflicting” defaults that are set by default-setters with misaligned interests.
In particular, agents with lower cognitive-reflection scores are significantly more likely to follow defaults
that are at odds with their private signals in the MIS treatment. This suggests that the negative payoff
consequences of default options may primarily be borne by decision makers with relatively low levels of
cognitive or strategic reasoning (see also Crawford 2003 and Wang et al. 2010).
24Attaining such understanding might, admittedly, be challenging: findings by Cain et al. (2005) indicate
that agents sometimes trust the information given by selfish advisers too strongly even if they are informed
about potential conflicts of interest.
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of defaults and the overall strength of default effects are increasing in the alignment of inter-
ests. We also observe that agents with lower information quality are indeed more susceptible
to accept default options, if these are in conflict with the agent’s individual information.
On a more general level, our analysis suggests that a comprehensive understanding of
defaults effects needs to account both for the individual-level factors that may strengthen the
impact of defaults (e.g., decision makers’ status quo biases or present-biased preferences), as
well as for the strategic aspects that are inherent in the interaction between default setters and
decision makers. Our framework also lends itself to a number of interesting extensions. These
include integrating the possibility that agents can spend cognitive resources for acquiring
additional information, the possibility of heterogeneous preferences of agents for a given
state of the world, or allowing for imperfect information about the opponent’s interests.
Finally, our findings potentially provide some interesting insights for the discussion on
“libertarian paternalistic” policy interventions. In particular, most participants in our ex-
periment do take the default setter’s strategic incentives and information into account, and
condition their acceptance of default options on both factors. However, our empirical results
also show that some agents misperceive the informational content of defaults and follow de-
faults from default setters with misaligned preferences too frequently. These findings suggest
that a high level understanding of default setters’ information and strategic incentives are
crucial to ensure that consumers react appropriately to default options. Consumer protection
policies such as mandatory disclosure laws might be a means to help decision makers attain
such understanding.
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Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Construction of an output equivalent equilibrium
Suppose strategy profile s with strategies sxA, sP constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Denote by D1 the set of all defaults being played in equilibrium and by D2 the nonempty set
of out-of-equilibrium defaults. Take any di ∈ D1 and dj ∈ D2. The strategy of the default
setter can be written as
sP : ρl → (. . . , p(di) = α1, . . . , p(dj) = 0, . . . ) , ρh → (. . . , p(di) = α2, . . . , p(dj) = 0, . . . ) .
Define a new strategy of the default setter:
ŝP : ρl →
(
. . . , p(di) =
α1
2
, . . . , p(dj) =
α1
2




. . . , p(di) =
α2
2
, . . . , p(dj) =
α2
2
, . . .
)
Moreover, construct new strategies ŝxA for the agents such that ŝ
x
A(dj, σ) = ŝ
x
A(di, σ) =
sxA(di, σ). Leaving everything else fixed, (ŝ
x
A, ŝP ) also constitutes a PBE. First note that
p(θ|di, σ) = p(θ|dj, σ) for both θ. According to Bayes’ rule these are also equivalent to the
conditional probabilities following di in the original equilibrium. Hence, agents’ maximiza-
tion problem is identical and the best responses do not change. Given their strategy, ŝP must
also be a best response, since messages di, dj induce the same action and the default setter
is indifferent between them. By subsequently adding all out-of-equilibrium defaults to the
set of equilibrium defaults, we can construct an output-equivalent equilibrium that does not
contain any out-of-equilibrium default.
Proof of Lemma 1
If the considered equilibrium is uninformative all defaults inhibit the same information.
Next, consider informative equilibria. Hence, there are at least two different defaults with
p(θh|dk) > p(θh|df ). Given the signal ρh, we show that it is always more profitable to play dk
for the default setter. The incentive function of the default setter, i.e., the expected payoff
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p(σl, θl|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θl, sxA(σl, dk))− UA(θl, sxA(σl, df ))) + b(sxA(σl, dk))− b(sxA(σl, df )))
+ p(σh, θl|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θl, sxA(σh, dk))− UA(θl, sxA(σh, df ))) + b(sxA(σh, dk))− b(sxA(σh, df )))
+ p(σl, θh|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θh, sxA(σl, dk))− UA(θh, sxA(σl, df ))) + b(sxA(σl, dk))− b(sxA(σl, df )))
+ p(σh, θh|ρh, x)(µ(UA(θh, sxA(σh, dk))− UA(θh, sxA(σh, df ))) + b(sxA(σh, dk))− b(sxA(σh, df )))f(x)dx.
The differences of the selfish parts b(z) of the utility function are clearly larger or equal to zero,
since the agents’ best responses to dk are weakly higher zs. We can, thus, concentrate on the
utility difference of the agents. The integral of these is larger than zero if this is fulfilled for all
x. Consider the difference for an arbitrary x with slightly rewritten conditional probabilities:
p(σl|ρh, x)p(θl|σl, ρh, x)(UA(θl, sxA(σl, dk))− UA(θl, sxA(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θl|σh, ρh, x)(UA(θl, sxA(σh, dk))− UA(θl, sxA(σh, df )))
+ p(σl|ρh, x)p(θh|σl, ρh, x)(UA(θh, sxA(σl, dk))− UA(θh, sxA(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θh|σh, ρh, x)(UA(θh, sxA(σh, dk))− UA(θh, sxA(σh, df ))).
The default setter conveys her information to the agents. Hence, p(θh|σ, ρh, x) is weakly larger
than p(θh|σ, dk, x), which represents the assessment of agent x after he observes default dk.
As the default setter puts more probability weight on situations where a higher z is profitable
for the agent, her expectation about the advantage of sxA(σ, dk) over s
x
A(σ, df ) is weakly higher
than the agent’s own expectation, which is given by
p(σl|ρh, x)p(θl|σl, dk, x)(UA(θl, sxA(σl, dk))− UA(θl, sxA(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θl|σh, dk, x)(UA(θl, sxA(σh, dk))− UA(θl, sxA(σh, df )))
+ p(σl|ρh, x)p(θh|σl, dk, x)(UA(θh, sxA(σl, dk))− UA(θh, sxA(σl, df )))
+ p(σh|ρh, x)p(θh|σh, dk, x)(UA(θh, sxA(σh, dk))− UA(θh, sxA(σh, df ))).
This in turn is strictly larger than zero as long as sxA(σ, dk) ̸= sxA(σ, df ) because agents
maximize their expected utility. The integral can only attain zero if the actions following
dk and df are equal for all agents. Since there is a continuum of agents with full support
over the interval [1
2
, 1], this can never be the case. We conclude that default df is played
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with probability zero whenever the default setter receives a high signal. Hence, every default
played in response to a high signal exhibits the same information. All other defaults reveal
that the default setter received a low signal.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that there is at most one positive transmission
rate cpd that is associated with an informative Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Second, we show
that this transmission rate increases in µ.
For the first step suppose there are two informative mixed equilibria with 0 < c1 < c2 < 1.
Agents always prefer an equilibrium corresponding to c2 since more information yields a
better decision and, thus, a higher expected payoff. The same is true for the default setter
if she receives a high signal because preferences are aligned in this case. If the default setter
receives a low signal, she is indifferent between both equilibria. To see this, suppose the
default setter chooses a message from the set Dl. Since this action reveals her signal (see
Lemma 1), the inherent information and the expected payoff associated with a low default
are equal in both equilibria. Furthermore, the default setter is also indifferent between a low
and a high default. Hence, the expected payoff after a high default must also be identical
in both equilibria. Overall, if there exist two mixed equilibria, the default setter prefers
the one with the higher information transmission rate. Moreover, she prefers an equilibrium
with c = 1 to any equilibrium with partial information revelation if the former exists. If she
receives a low signal the utility in a full revelation equilibrium is identical to the utility in
any mixed equilibrium. After a high signal, however, she benefits from the revelation of her
signal. Hence, only the highest information rate that is implementable in equilibrium can be
associated with a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.
In the second step, we show that cpd is weakly increasing in µ. For this purpose first







A(σ, dl))|ρh, x]f(x)dx does not vary in the transmission rate cpd. In
the assumed equilibrium, the default setter is indifferent between a high and a low default











A(σ, dl))|ρl, x]f(x)dx = 0.
The change of cpd with increasing µ in Pareto-efficient equilibria can be derived by implicit
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The numerator of this fraction is smaller than zero, if∫ 1
1
2
p(σl, θl|ρl, x)(UA(θl, sxA(σl, dh))− UA(θl, sxA(σl, dl))))
+ p(σh, θl|ρl, x)(UA(θl, sxA(σh, dh))− UA(θl, sxA(σh, dl)))
+ p(σl, θh|ρl, x)(UA(θh, sxA(σl, dh))− UA(θh, sxA(σl, dl)))
+ p(σh, θh|ρl, x)(UA(θh, sxA(σh, dh))− UA(θh, sxA(σh, dl)))f(x)dx ≤ 0.
This follows if the inequality holds for all x. Since defaults convey less information than the
signal of the default setter and agents maximize their utility the same argument as in Lemma













Suppose that the latter derivative is negative. As a consequence, the payoff from a low de-
fault is larger than the one from a high default for all transmission rates larger than cpd.
In particular, this also holds for c = 1, implying that there exists an equilibrium with full
information transmission. This is a contradiction to the assumption that the postulated equi-
librium with transmission rate cpd is Pareto-efficient. Hence, the information transmission
rate is increasing for informative Pareto-efficient equilibria with partial information transmis-
sion. Therefore, it is also weakly increasing for any informative Pareto-efficient equilibrium.
Since agents are Bayesian updaters, this leads to weakly stronger responses, i.e., sxA(σi, dh) is
increasing and sxA(σi, dl) is decreasing in µ.
Proof of Proposition 2
We assumed that the partial derivative with respect to z of UA(z, θl) is smaller than the
corresponding derivative of UA(z, θh) for all z. Hence, higher zs are optimal if the agent puts
more probability weight on θh. Since agents are Bayesian updaters, they weigh their private
signal stronger if it conveys more information. For any given equilibrium, agents are thus
more prone to follow the default if they have less private information.
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A.2 Supplementary Figures

































Figure A.2: Frequency with which default setters set default according to their signal. Av-
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Figure A.3: Frequency with which agents follow default option. Average values for 5-period
intervals in FUL, PAR, and MIS.
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A.3 Instructions of the Experiment
In what follows, we present a translation of the instructions for the PAR treatment. The in-
structions for the other treatments had a similar structure and differed only in the description
of player A’s incentives.
Welcome to today’s decision experiment!
Please read the following information carefully. Everything that you need to know to
participate in this experiment is explained below. Should you have any difficulties in under-
standing these instructions please raise your hand. We will answer your questions at your
cubicle.
For your arrival on time you receive an initial endowment of 4 euros. During the experiment,
you can earn further money by earning points. The amount of points that you earn during
the experiment depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. All points
that you earn during the experiment will be added up and converted into euros at the end
of the experiment. The exchange rate is:
100 Points = 1 euro
The experiment consists of several periods. In each period you have to make decisions, which
you feed into the computer. There will be 50 periods in total. At the end of the experiment,
the amount of money that you earned during the experiment and your initial endowment will
be paid out in cash. Please hand in all received documents when you collect your payment
at the end of the experiment.
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the entire
experiment. In addition, we would like to point out that you may only use the computer
functions which are required for the experiment. Violations of these rules will lead to an
exclusion from the experiment. In case you have any questions we shall be glad to assist you.
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Short Overview of the Experimental Procedures
The experiment consists of several periods. In each period you have to make decisions which
you feed into the computer. There will be 50 periods in total.
In the experiment participants will be divided into three groups. The participants of the three
groups will be named player 1A, player 1B and player 2 during the entire experiment. There
will be 6 participants of type 1A, 6 participants of type 1B and 12 participants of
type 2. Your role will be drawn randomly at the beginning of the experiment, and presented
to you on your screen. Your role remains the same during the entire experiment.
In each period of the experiment groups will be formed either consisting of one player 1A
and one player 2 or one player 1B and one player 2. For each period new groups of two
players will be formed randomly. The probability that your group in a certain period
consist of one player 1A and one player 2 is thus 50%. The probability that your group in a
certain period consist of one player 1B and one player 2 is also 50%. Player 2 learns only at
the very end of a given period whether he was in a group with a player of type 1A
or 1B in that period. The experiment is conducted fully anonymously. This means that
you and the other participants never get to know with whom you were matched during the
experiment. Only the other group member in a given period will get to know your choices
in that period. All of the other participants will learn nothing about your decisions.
In each period of the experiment player 2 has to make a decision about which color appears
more often in a set of cards. In each period there will be a set of 9 cards. Each of the
9 cards can be either red or black. Player 1A or player 1B receives information about
the number of red and black cards in the current set and makes a preselection for player
2. Player 2 also receives information about the number of red and black cards and makes the
final decision for the group. He can either confirm the preselection of the other group
member, or make a different decision.
In each period a new set of cards will be generated randomly for each group. The
probability that a certain card of the set is red or black is 50%. That is, for each card it
is equal likely to be red or black. Hence, in each period it will be independently and
randomly drawn how many red or black cards appear and the order of the cards. At the
beginning of a period the probability that there are more red or more black cards is thus
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the same. The number of red and black cards does not depend on the cards of the previous
period or on the cards of another group.
The final decision of player 2 determines the earnings of both members of the group:
• Player 1A earns 50 points, if the final decision is “more red cards”. He earns 0 points
if the final decision is “more black cards”.
• Player 1B earns 50 points, if player 2 chooses the color that appears more frequently
in the actual set of cards. He earns 0 points if player 2 chooses the wrong color.
• Player 2 earns 50 points, if his decision is the color that appears more frequently in
the actual set of cards. He earns 0 points if the final decision is the wrong color.
The Experimental Procedures in Detail
Each period consists of two stages. On the first stage a new set of cards will be generated for
each group. Afterwards the players get incomplete information about which color appears
more often in their current set of cards. On the second stage, player 1A or player 1B chooses
a preselection on the color of the cards. Player 2 gets to know the preselection and makes
the final decision for the group. He can confirm the preselection or make a different decision.
The decision of player 2 is the final decision for the entire group. That is, only the decision
of player 2 determines the earnings of both group members.
Player 1 (that is, player 1A or 1B) receives his information about the amount of red
and black cards in the current set of cards via a signal on his screen. There are two possible
signals which can be displayed on the screen: either the signal for player 1 is “more
red cards” or the signal is “more black cards”. In each group only player 1 gets this signal.
The probability of a correct signal for player 1 is 80%. That is, player 1 gets to know the
color that actually appears more often in the current card set of his group in on average 80
out of 100 cases. On average he gets a wrong signal about the color that actually appears
more often in the set of cards in 20 out of 100 cases. Only at the end of a given period,
player 1 can determine whether he got a correct or incorrect signal. Whether a signal
is correct or incorrect in a certain period will be randomly and independently
determined in each period. That is, the probability that player1 gets the correct signal
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is always exactly 80% and independent of the correctness of her signals in previous periods.
The probability of a correct signal is also independent of the information player 2 or other
players of type 1A or 1B receive in a certain period. None of the other participants ever gets
to know which signal player 1 received in a certain period.
Player 2 receives his information about the number of red and black cards by the uncov-
ering of a subset of the set of 9 cards. In each period either two or five cards will be
uncovered for player 2. The probability that two cards will be uncovered in a given period is
50%. The probability that five cards will be uncovered in a given period is also 50%. That
is, in on average 50 out of 100 cases two cards will be uncovered, and in 50 out
of 100 cases five cards will be uncovered.
Whether player 2 gets to know two or five cards in a certain period will be drawn randomly
and independently across periods. The number of cards a certain player 2 gets to know is
also independent of the number of cards that other players of type 2 get to know. Finally,
the draw whether player 2 gets displayed two or five cards is independent of the correctness
of the signal of the other group member. All other participants never get to know how many
cards were uncovered for player 2 in a given period.
Once player 1 and player 2 have seen their information, the second stage of the period begins.
On the second stage player 1 (that is, player 1A or 1B) makes a preselection for
player 2. Player 1 can choose between two options for the preselection. She can either
choose “more black cards”, or “more red cards”. The following screen is displayed to her,
on which she can make her decision. She chooses the preselection by clicking the respective
button.
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Afterwards, player 2 is informed about the preselection which the other group mem-
ber chose for him. The following screen is shown to player 2, on which the preselection of
player 1 is displayed (instead of gray rectangular in the middle of the screen, a red or black
field will be displayed):
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Subsequently, player 2 makes the final decision for the entire group. He can confirm
the preselection of the other group member or change the selection. If player 2 confirms
the preselection, this is the final decision for the group. If player 2 decides to change
the selection he sees a new screen. On this screen, he can choose either “more black cards”
or “more red cards”. At the time of his decision, player 2 doesn’t know whether he is in a
group with a player of type 1A or 1B. The decision of player 2 is the final decision for
both group members. The final decision of player 2 determines the earnings for the entire
group.
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How are incomes calculated?
The earnings of player 1A, player 1B and player 2 in a given period are calculated as follows.
Player 1A:
• If the final decision is “more red cards” player 1A earns an income of 50 points.
• If the final decision is “more black cards” player 1A earns an income of 0 points.
Player 1B:
• If the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears more frequently
in the set of cards player 1B earns an income of 50 points.
• If the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears less frequently
in the set of cards player 1B earns an income of 0 points.
Player 2:
• If the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears more frequently
in the set of cards player 2 earns an income of 50 points.
• If the final decision is equal to the color that actually appears less frequently
in the set of cards player 2 earns an income of 0 points.
At the end of a period, the complete set of cards from this period will be displayed to both
group members. You are also informed about the earnings of both group members in this
period. Subsequently a new period begins, for which new groups of two participants of type
1A or 1B and 2 will be formed randomly.
In case you have any questions, please raise your hand.
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